EmTract: Investor Emotions and Market Behavior

We develop a tool that extracts emotions from social media text data. Our methodology has three main advantages. First, it is tailored for financial context; second, it incorporates key aspects of social media data, such as non-standard phrases, emojis and emoticons; and third, it operates by sequentially learning a latent representation that includes features such as word order, word usage, and local context. This tool, along with a user guide is available at: https://github.com/dvamossy/EmTract. Using EmTract, we explore the relationship between investor emotions expressed on social media and asset prices. We document a number of interesting insights. First, we confirm some of the findings of controlled laboratory experiments relating investor emotions to asset price movements. Second, we show that investor emotions are predictive of daily price movements. These impacts are larger when volatility or short interest are higher, and when institutional ownership or liquidity are lower. Third, increased investor enthusiasm prior to the IPO contributes to the large first-day return and long-run underperformance of IPO stocks. To corroborate our results, we provide a number of robustness checks, including using an alternative emotion model. Our findings reinforce the intuition that emotions and market dynamics are closely related, and highlight the importance of considering investor emotions when assessing a stock's short-term value.Comment: Substantial changes to the projec

The Nordic Corporate Governance Model

The Nordic Region is remarkable in many ways and has been the subject of increasing interest over the past years. The five countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are culturally closely aligned and combine a well-functioning business sector and high GDP with an expansive welfare state and high taxes. What has been well less known outside the Nordic Region is the shared corporate governance model used by companies and for the first time a comprehensive study is available in English to explain this model. The main part of the study is the condensed presentation of the Nordic CG model. It is based on four country reports covering the three EU Member States (DK, F, S) and one EEA Member State (N). Each country report has been drawn up by a team consisting of a legal expert and a corporate governance expert with practical experience. To ensure that the report reflects actual practices, each team was assisted by a reference group consisting of business practitioners with extensive experience from large-cap listed companies and connections to the national CG code committees. To provide an international aspect, the renowned American scholar Ronald J Gilson contributed a comment on the report’s findings in a separate chapter. The key observation of the study is that the Nordic CG model allows the shareholder majority to effectively control and take long-term responsibility for the company that they own. The alleged risk of such a system – the potential that a shareholder majority misuses its power for its own benefit at the expense of minority shareholders – is effectively curbed through a well-developed system of minority protection. The result is a governance model that encourages strong shareholders to engage in the governance of the company in their own interest, while creating value for the company and all its shareholders

Response to the European Commission\u27s Report on the Application of the Takeover Bids Directive

This paper contains the European Company Law Experts\u27 response to the report of the European Commission of 28 June 2012 on the application of the Takeover Bids Directive of 2004 and the reform initiatives announced. For evaluating these initiatives the rationale of the mandatory bid rule is relevant (exit rationale, control premium rationale and undistorted choice rationale). On this basis the paper discusses each of the concerns raised by the European Commission: 1) The concept of acting in concert : The ECLE are of the opinion that a uniform concept for the Takeover Bids Directive, the Transparency Directive and the Acquisition Directive is not useful because of the different objectives of these Directives. As to the Takeover Directive it should be made clear that joint engagement activities of investors should not trigger a mandatory offer. 2) National derogations to the mandatory offer rule differ widely, but there are different types of derogations that pose different concerns. The ECLE recommend that the Directive should provide for a review process with respect to national derogations. 3) The ECLE believe that there are good reasons to close the loopholes against the “creep in” and the “creep on” acquisitions. 4) As to board neutrality and the break-through rule the ECLE believe that the default rules should be changed. The option rights should be given to the shareholders, not to the member states. The reciprocity rule is flawed. 5) The protection of the rights of employees should be addressed in a wider context and should not be taken up specifically for one type of transaction such as takeover bids

European Company Law Experts' Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper 'The EU Corporate Governance Framework'

This paper constitutes the European Company Law Experts' response to the European Commission's Green Paper "The EU Corporate Governance Framework". The paper contains responses to the individual questions put forward by the Commission as well as an introductory statement. In this statement we first set out briefly the rationale for having rules on corporate governance, whether those rules are determined at national or EU level and whether they are contained in hard or soft law. We then consider the rationale for taking action at EU level. Thirdly, we make a suggestion as to how the choice between hard and soft law should be made. Fourth, we consider the overall implications of the previous arguments for the division of rule-making between the EU and Member States

Fjellrev i Finnmark : forskning og tiltak 2004

Faglig årsrapport for 2004 til DN